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[W]hat I want and all my days I pine for is to go back to my house
and see my day of homecoming. And if some god batters me far out
on the wine-blue water, I will endure it, keeping a stubborn spirit
inside me, for already I have suffered much and done much hard
work on the waves and in the fighting.'
-Odysseus
Oh for shame, how the mortals put the blame upon us gods, for they
say evils come from us, but it is they, rather, who by their own reck-
lessness win sorrow beyond what is given . . .
-Zeus
1. INTRODUCTION
Judicial authority must include the power to punish for contempt.
Otherwise, "if a party can make himself a judge of the validity of orders
which have been issued, and by his own act of disobedience set them
aside, then are the courts impotent, and what the Constitution now fit-
tingly calls the 'judicial power of the United States' would be a mere
mockery."'
On April 5, 1995, H. Beatty Chadwick, a Pennsylvania lawyer, was
arrested for civil contempt in connection with his divorce proceeding.'
Fourteen years later, on July 10, 2009, and after having made numerous
attempts5 to secure his freedom, he was released from the Delaware
County Jail in Pennsylvania.6 His imprisonment was, and likely remains,
1. THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 94 (Richmond Lattimore trans., First Perennial Classics 1999)
(1965).
2. Id. at 28.
3. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911).
4. Chadwick v. Janecka, No. 00-1130, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3,
2002), rev'd, 302 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2002).
5. See infra Section V.
6. Mari A. Schaefer, Chadwick Freed After 14-Year Contempt Sentence, PHILADELPHIA
MODERN ODYSSEUS OR CLASSIC FRAUD
a United States record for such a charge.7
This article will examine a difficult question-at what point, and
under what circumstances, will imprisonment for civil contempt, with-
out a jury trial, violate the Due Process Clause' of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution simply by being too
lengthy? Upon hearing that an individual had been imprisoned for so
long, and only by a judge's decision, one could, and likely would, be
moved to protest or even express outrage. Sympathy for such a person
would likely be inherent in such a response. However, as the facts of his
case will demonstrate,' Chadwick is very far from a sympathetic figure.
Perhaps that best qualifies him, along with his lengthy incarceration, as a
suitable lens through which due process protections in this context, or
the lack thereof, may be examined.
Section H of this article details the factual background that caused
Chadwick to be imprisoned. Section III provides a summary of the dif-
ferences between civil and criminal contempt, followed by a discussion
of recent Supreme Court holdings as to the former. In Section IV the
article discusses Pennsylvania law, the state of Chadwick's imprison-
ment, as it is pertinent to civil contempt. Section V details his fourteen
years of legal efforts to gain his freedom. In Section VI, the article dis-
cusses the legal "Catch-22" in which Chadwick found himself. Section
VII discusses the lack of unanimity as well as silence in the Circuit
Courts regarding the application of due process and the concept of "lost
coercive effect" in the civil contempt arena. In Section VIII the author
discusses the need for ensuring that due process is available to those in
prison for civil contempt, and suggests enhanced protections to place
limits on what at this time is a vehicle for the exercise of judicial power
without limitation. The article concludes in Section IX.
II. MODERN ODYSSEUS OR CLASSIC FRAUD?
Every court that considered the issue found that Chadwick did have
the ability to comply with a July 22, 1994, trial court order in his divorce
proceeding requiring him to return $2,502,000 in alleged marital assets
to an account under its jurisdiction."o As will be discussed in Section
INQUIRER, July 11, 2009, at A01, available at Access World News, Record No.
20090711_inq-national-SCHADWICK.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I("... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
9. See infra Section II.
10. See Chadwick v. Janecka, 302 F.3d 107, 118 (3d Cir. 2002); see also infra at Section V.
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II," sound reasons supported these findings. The question then arises-
was Chadwick a modem Odysseus fighting honorably against heavy
odds, or a classic fraud bent on violating the court's order no matter the
cost?
The answer begins, seemingly innocently enough, with his meeting
twenty-year-old Barbara Jean "Bobbie" Crowther in 1976 and marrying
her one year later. 12 By then he had told her that his great-great-great-
great-great-uncle, Charles Thompson, had signed the Declaration of
Independence, but omitted the facts that Thompson had no sons of his
own and the relation only came about through a marriage several centu-
ries ago." He spoke of family trust funds, but did not reveal that they
were set up to skip a generation-his.1" He cried while she sat on his lap
in 1977 as he told her that he was dying of cancer and only had two
years to live. While he did in fact have radiation treatment for a
lymphomic tumor, two years later, in 1979, he told her he had seven
years to live.' 5
Two personality traits material to his fourteen year course of action
became evident after he and Bobbie were married-his need for control
and his cheapness. As one colleague put it, "Beatty Chadwick was so
tight he squeaked."16 Employed as in-house counsel for I.U. Interna-
tional, a large utility and trucking conglomerate,1 7 he started Bobbie on
an allowance of $37.50 every week to cover all of the household food,
as well as all of her clothes and personal items.' 8 When Chadwick told
her they could not afford the cost of redecorating, Bobbie learned to
reupholster their furniture. She "refinished the floors, did all the paint-
ing, built the kitchen table with the tiled top, plastered and wallpapered
the bathrooms and made the window shutters with windows she
bought."' Bobbie also mowed the expansive lawn of their Bryn Mawr
mansion.20 She made her own clothes and cut out coupons. Even before
they were married, Bobbie had given up her job running a Christian
education program at the age of twenty after Chadwick "had assured her
11. See infra Section n, as well as further factual findings reflected in some of the Chadwick
cases discussed in Section V.
12. Lisa DePaulo, Scorched Earth, PHILADELPHIA MAGAZINE, 1995, at 46-47.
13. Id. at 44.
14. Id. at 46.
15. Id. at 47.
16. Id. at 46.
17. Id. at 45.
18. Id. at 47.
19. Id. at 77.
20. Christopher McDougall, The Prisoner Who Wouldn't Leave: Main Line Lawyer Beatty
Chadwick Could Get out of Jail Tomorrow if He'd Just Open His Mouth - and His Swiss Bank
Account, PHILADELPHIA MAGAZINE, 2001, at 107-08.
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that he loved her so much she would never have to work." 2 1 And,
because he "loved her so much he wanted to be with her every minute,
including being driven to and picked up from work by her every day,"
she gave up her car.22
When money was really tight for her she would not eat. At various
times in their marriage, at 5'7" tall, she weighed slightly less than 100
pounds. 23 Bobbie hosted lavish parties in their home at which she would
serve dinner for up to 100 people, without any help of any kind, "even a
maid to help with the dishes."2 4 Before these parties, Chadwick would
tell her how to dress, or "rather, undress for the evening" like "a tramp,"
and then smirk at dinner while his male guests ogled her, she has
alleged.2 5
By 1992, after continuing to endure what Bobbie said was abusive
treatment in these and other ways, she told Chadwick that she was leav-
ing him.2 6 He replied, over and over, "You're dead. You're not going to
get a cent."27 Before leaving, she searched his desk and found a trove of
financial records. They helped show that Chadwick's net worth had
grown from about $212,000 at the time they were married to roughly
$4,000,000.28
Bobbie filed for divorce in November of 1992. Three months later,
at an equitable distribution conference, Chadwick told the court that he
had transferred $2,502,000 of the marital estate "to satisfy an alleged
debt to Maison Blanche, Ltd., . . . a Gibraltar partnership."2 9 Bobbie
knew nothing of this.
At a hearing on July 22, 1994, with both Chadwick and his counsel
present, the trial court "determined Chadwick's transfer of the money
was an attempt to defraud Ms. Chadwick and the court."3 0 He ordered
that Chadwick "return the $2,502,000.00 to an account under the juris-
diction of the court, pay $75,000.00 for Ms. Chadwick's attorney's fees
and costs, surrender his passport and remain within the jurisdiction. "31
After Chadwick refused to comply, Mrs. Chadwick filed a petition
to hold him in civil contempt that resulted in hearings on August 29,
21. See DePaulo, supra note 12, at 47.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 77.
25. Id.
26. See generally DePaulo, supra note 12 and McDougall, supra note 20.
27. See DePaulo, supra note 12, at 79.
28. Id.
29. Chadwick v. Janecka, No. 00-1130, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3,
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October 18, and October 31, 1994.32 Chadwick never personally
appeared, although his attorney did." "The court found Mr. Chadwick in
contempt of the July 22, 1994, order and issued a bench warrant for his
arrest." 34
On April 5, 1995, he was still free. As a lawyer, he well knew that
this warrant was valid only in Pennsylvania.35 However, Chadwick had
a dental appointment at 7 a.m. that day in Philadelphia, and, as Ms.
Chadwick noted, "Beatty never missed his appointment to get his teeth
cleaned." 36 He did not know, however, that his longtime dental hygienist
had read about this well-publicized divorce, was sick to learn of Ms.
Chadwick's situation, and had alerted her to the date and time of the
appointment.
Two sheriffs deputies entered the treatment room while Chadwick
was lying back in the dental chair with a bib around his neck and told
him he was under arrest. His first response, in a room that contained his
dental records, was to deny who he was (he claimed to be "Mr. John-
son"). When this failed, Chadwick, a "scrawny 58-year old," attacked
the two "burly" deputies." In the melee that followed, among other
sequelae, "the walls ended up bloody and with gaping holes," and Chad-
wick gave one deputy a black eye and bite marks on his hand that lasted
for days. By the time Chadwick was handcuffed, eight Philadelphia
police officers had arrived."
The trial court held that Chadwick had the present ability to comply
with the terms of its July 22, 1994, order. It set bail at $3,000,000.00. At
any time, Chadwick could have been released either by (1) posting bail,
or (2) purging his contempt by complying with the order and depositing
$2,502,000.00 in the court's account.
Following his arrest, and after further investigation by Ms. Chad-
wick's attorneys, Chadwick testified again about the missing fortune.
His testimony revealed the following:4 0
1. He had invested $5,000 in Maison Blanche in 1990. There was a
32. Chadwick v. Andrews, No. 97-4680, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20506, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
23, 1997).
33. Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 600 (3d Cir. 2002).
34. Id.
35. Lisa DePaulo, Rinse, Spit, Put Up Your Hands, PHILADELPHIA MAGAZINE, June 1995, at
35.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 36.
38. Id.
39. Chadwick v. Janecka, No. 00-1130, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3,
2002), rev'd, 302 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2002).
40. See McDougall, supra note 20, at 110; see also DePaulo, supra note 35, at 37; DePaulo,
supra note 12, at 84.
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caveat, however, in that if Maison Blanche ever had financial
difficulties Chadwick would have to provide additional funds -
without apparent limitation. Chadwick was a "highly regarded
corporate attorney with 20 years' experience in international
law."4 1 He never was able to produce a check for this $5,000;
rather, he said he had paid in cash (to the company in Gibraltar).
2. In 1993 Maison Blanche sent him a three-line message demand-
ing about $2,502,000 for its debts. Coincidentally, this was
Chadwick's entire fortune. "Without telling his lawyer or his
accountant," Chadwick "emptied his stock portfolio and IRA's
and wired the funds to Gibraltar."4 2 He did this one day before
Bobbie's first support hearing. As for why he did not contest this
debt call, he said that he was an "honorable man."43
3. Tracking this money proved difficult. Of the $2,502,000 sent
overseas, evidence showed that in April 1993, Maison Blanche
returned $869,106 to a Chemical Bank of New York account in
the name of an "H.B. Chadwick." An additional $995,726 had
been transferred to a Swiss bank account in his name. And,
$550,000 in stock certificates that Chadwick said he had sent to
an unknown barrister in England to forward to Maison Blanche
was never received.
4. As for the $869,106, Chadwick said it must be another "H.B.
Chadwick" as he had no connection to the account. He also said
it was coincidence that this sum was the exact amount of an IRA
account he had when he "lost all his money."" That it was
deposited into the Chemical Bank account 59 days after it was
originally withdrawn was apparently also a coincidence, as an
IRA that is not transferred into a new IRA within 60 days will
incur a penalty.
5. This $869,106 was then divided into three separate life insurance
tax-free annuities. Each had the name "H.B. Chadwick;" the
social security numbers were the same as his except one digit
was an 8 instead of a 3; and the number with the "8" in it had
never been issued to anyone. The signatures on the policies
matched Chadwick's. His sons were the beneficiaries. Chadwick
denied they were his policies.
6. These policies were later cashed out, with the proceeds being
sent to a "H.B. Chadwick" at a post office box in Shireman-
stown, PA. Chadwick denied having any connection with it,
despite his girlfriend having a home nearby. A PNC bank official
testified that Chadwick had to come to his office two separate
times to cash out one of the insurance checks, and had shown his
41. See McDougall, supra note 20, at 110.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See DePaulo, supra note 12, at 84.
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driver's license both times to do so. Furthermore, the official
identified Chadwick in court as being the same person. Chad-
wick still denied any connection with these proceeds, and said he
had never seen the bank official before in his life.
7. The $869,106 was last known to be in Panama, and the $995,726
in Gibraltar and Luxembourg. The remainder, more than
$500,000, has never been found.45
Several times during Chadwick's testimony, the trial court
"exploded in disbelief, calling his story 'incredible' and 'ridiculous.' "
4 6
It asked Chadwick if he would "turn over his passport and give his
wife's lawyers access to those savings accounts in Panama and Switzer-
land." Chadwick said he would, but only if he was released first. The
trial court declined, refusing to give Chadwick "a head start in a race for
the cash."47 Thus his fourteen years of imprisonment began. And, so did
his challenges to it.
III. THE SUPREME COURT: CONTINUING TO DEFINE THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CONTEMPT
With the adoption of the Constitution, English common law,
including the power of contempt, became the law of the United States.4 8
Today, the power of contempt is statutory. 49 That such power is neces-
sary for courts to enforce their orders is clear. 0 However, despite the
passage of time and judicial usage,"1 the Supreme Court in the last half-
century has still felt it necessary to both clarify and define this power
and its limits. Exemplifying this is its decision in Shillitani v. United
45. Id.
46. See McDougall, supra note 20, at 112.
47. Id.
48. See Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925) (adopting English common law as
an important tool of interpretation).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2010) ("A court of the United States shall have power to punish by
fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as -
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice; (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; (3) Disobedience or
resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 402
(2010) (relating to criminal contempt).
50. See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888) ("[The power of contempt] is absolutely
essential to the protection of the courts in the discharge of their functions. Without it, judicial
tribunals would be at the mercy of the disorderly and violent, who respect neither the laws enacted
for the vindication of public and private rights, nor the officers charged with the duty of
administering them.").
51. See, e.g., Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345 (2000),
for an extensive history of the law of contempt, which is outside the scope of this article; see also
William F. Chinnock & Mark P. Painter, The Law of Contempt of Court in Ohio, 34 U. TOL. L.
REV. 309, 312-17 (2003).
606 [Vol. 66:599
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52States, in which the Court undertook a detailed examination of the
differences between criminal and civil contempt.
In Shillitani, Petitioners refused to answer questions before a grand
jury after having been granted immunity. Without indictment or jury
trial, they were found guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to two
years of imprisonment. The Court considered the "difficult question" 5 3
of whether indictment and jury trial were required. It noted that although
both the District Court and the Second. Circuit had termed petitioners'
conduct to be "criminal contempt," this did not affect the Court's finding
that "the character and purpose of these actions clearly render them civil
rather than criminal contempt proceedings." 54 If it had been the latter,
the contemnor would have had the right to a jury trial." The Court in
detail laid the lines of demarcation between the two:
1. "The act of disobedience consisted solely 'in refusing to do what
had been ordered,' i.e., to answer the questions, not 'in doing
what had been prohibited.' "
5 6
2. The judgments of contempt allowed for immediate release if they
answered the questions. Because the petitioners carried "'the
keys of their prison in their own pockets,'" 5 7 "the action 'is
essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties
'"58
3. "'It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and
purpose that often serve to distinguish' civil from criminal
contempt."5 9
4. "Despite the fact that [petitioners] were ordered imprisoned for a
definite period, their sentences were clearly intended to operate
in a prospective manner-to coerce, rather than punish. As such,
they relate to civil contempt. While any imprisonment, of course,
has punitive and deterrent effects, it must be viewed as remedial
if the court conditions release upon the contemnor's willingness
52. 384 U.S. 364 (1966). The Court had previously acknowledged that contempts are "neither
wholly civil nor altogether criminal." Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441
(1911). It also acknowledged that "it may not always be easy to classify a particular act as
belonging to either one of these two classes." Id. (citing Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S.
324, 329 (1904)).
53. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 365.
54. Id. at 368.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (2010). However, "petty" criminal contempt, considered to be that
resulting in up to six months imprisonment, does not require a jury trial. See Muniz v. Hoffman,
422 U.S. 454, 475-76 (1975).
56. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 368 (citing Gompers, 221 U.S. at 449).
57. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 368 (citing In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902)).
58. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 368 (citing Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197 (1958)
(Black, J., dissenting)).
59. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 369 (citing Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441). Additionally, the Supreme
Court made it clear that "a compensatory fine payable to the complainant" is also "remedial" and
therefore a sign that the contempt is civil and not criminal. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 448.
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to testify."60
5. "The test may be stated as: what does the court primarily seek to
accomplish by imposing sentence?" 61
The Court's most recent attempt to define the differences between
criminal and civil contempt came in International Union, United Mine
Workers of America v. Bagwell.6 2 The specific issue was whether fines
for contempt levied for violations of a labor injunction were "coercive
civil fines" or "criminal fines Ahat constitutionally could be imposed
only through a jury trial."6 3
During a protracted labor dispute with two mining companies over
alleged unfair labor practices, the Mine Workers were enjoined in a
complex order from, among other things, obstructing ingress and egress
to company facilities and picketing with more than a specified number
of people at certain sites. The trial court subsequently ruled that the
union had committed seventy-two violations of the injunction, and fined
it $642,000 for its disobedience of the injunction. It also announced that
future violations would result in fines of $100,000 for each breach if
violent, and $20,000 if nonviolent. In seven subsequent contempt hear-
ings the trial court found that the union had committed more than 400
separate and additional violations. The court gave the union a panoply of
protections. Each.of the contempt hearings was conducted as a separate
civil proceeding, with the parties conducting discovery, introducing evi-
dence, and calling and cross-examining witnesses. Notably for a civil
proceeding, it required that "contumacious acts be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."' The one protection that was not afforded the union,
however, was that of a jury trial.65
In total, the union was fined over $64 million. Of this amount, $12
million was ordered to be paid to the companies, and $52 million to the
Commonwealth of Virginia along with the two counties most affected
by the unlawful activity. 66
The parties settled the underlying labor dispute while appeals of the
contempt orders were pending, and agreed to vacate the contempt fines
and dismiss the case. The trial court vacated the $12 million payable to
the companies, but not the remaining $52 million because they "were
60. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 369-70.
61. Id. at 370.
62. 512 U.S. 821 (1994). "We are called upon once again to consider the distinction between
civil and criminal contempt." Id. at 823.
63. Id.
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coercive, civil fines" and "payable in effect to the public." 6 7 With the
parties to the suit withdrawing due to the settlement, the court appointed
a Special Commissioner to pursue the unpaid contempt fines for the
Commonwealth and the counties. The Court of Appeals of Virginia
ordered the fines vacated.6 1 "[A]ssum[ing], without deciding, these fines
are civil sanctions,"69 it held that the trial court did not have discretion to
refuse to vacate them where the parties settled the civil proceeding in
which they were imposed.
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed7 0 on two grounds, first
holding that Virginia public policy disfavored eliminating civil contempt
sanctions after settlement "if the dignity of the law and public respect for
the judiciary are to be maintained."" Secondly, it rejected the union's
claim that the fines were criminal and therefore it was entitled to a jury
trial. As the Supreme Court described it, "[b]ecause the trial court's pro-
spective fine schedule was intended to coerce compliance with the
injunction and the union could avoid the fines through obedience, the
court reasoned, the fines were civil and coercive and properly imposed
in civil proceedings ....
The U.S. Supreme Court began its analysis with a statement of the
rights owed a defendant charged with criminal contempt. These include
the protections of the Constitution for a crime generally, among them
notice of charges, assistance of counsel, summary process, the privilege
against self-incrimination, conviction occurring only upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, and, for "serious" criminal contempts involving
imprisonment of more than six months, the right to jury trial."
In contrast, the Court noted, sanctions for civil contempt "are con-
sidered to be coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may
be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard."7 Despite the trial court having required proof beyond
a reasonable doubt for what it termed civil contempt, the Supreme Court
held that burden of proof was not required.7 ' Then, as it had done before
67. Id. at 825.
68. International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 402
S.E.2d 899, 905 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
69. Id. at 902.
70. Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America, 423 S.E.2d 349, 360
(Va. 1992).
71. Id. at 358.
72. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826.
73. Id. at 826-27.
74. Id. at 827.
75. Id. The Court did not state what the burden of proof should be in a case of civil contempt,
and apparently never directly has. See also United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 765 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("'At this stage of the proceedings, the government has not met its
BURDEN of showing by CLEAR AND CONVNCING evidence that Rylander is in contempt."' (citing
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in Shillitani,7 6 and still earlier in other cases," the Court took on the task
of explaining at length" the "'conceptually unclear and exceedingly dif-
ficult to apply' 7"" distinction between civil and criminal contempt.o
Having done so, the Court found that the $52 million in fines were crim-
inal in nature. First, they were "not coercive day fines, or even sus-
pended fines, but [were] more closely analogous to fixed, determinate,
retrospective criminal fines which petitioners had no opportunity to
purge once imposed.""' Additionally, the sanctionable conduct "did not
occur in the court's presence or otherwise implicate the court's ability to
maintain order and adjudicate the proceedings before it. . . ." or, involve
"simple, affirmative acts."8 2 Finally, "[t]he union's contumacy lasted
many months and spanned a substantial portion of the State. The fines
assessed were serious, totaling over $52 million."" For these reasons,
the Court held, "disinterested factfinding and evenhanded adjudication
were essential, and petitioners were entitled to a criminal jury trial" in
what was a complex injunction case.84
Assuming the Court here provided new protections to contemnors
by holding their contempt to be criminal and not civil in complex
cases,85 and requiring a jury trial for them, this was at least counterbal-
anced by part of its holding bearing on those facing civil contempt. In
Gompers,8 6 the Court had held that a defendant in civil contempt
"stand[s] committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act
required by the court's order."" It did not, however, explicitly say that
such incarceration could be indefinite. In Bagwell, however, it did: "The
United States v. Rylander, 656 F.2d 1313, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1981))). However, in Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979), where appellant was indefinitely committed to a state mental
hospital, the Court noted first that it had "repeatedly recognized that civil commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)." It ultimately held that a
"clear and convincing" standard of proof is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in a civil proceeding brought under state law to commit such an individual. Id. at 433.
76. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
77. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
78. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827-30.
79. Id. at 827 n.3 (citing Earl C. Dudley Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A
New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1033 (1993)).
80. See also Livingston, supra note 51, at 426 (arguing that the Court expanded the scope of
criminal contempt, to the detriment of the ability of civil litigants to seek relief for violations of
court orders).
81. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 837.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 838.
85. See Livingston, supra note 51, at 384-86.
86. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
87. Id. at 442.
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paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction, as set forth in Gompers,
involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until he complies with an
affirmative command such as an order 'to pay alimony, or to surrender
property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a
conveyance.'""'
Moreover, the sheer breadth of this phrase could, in the hands of
some judges, bespeak a life sentence (and, without a jury trial). As it
pertained to Chadwick, it almost did." And, this phrase was crafted by
Justice Blackmun, who also acknowledged the following about con-
tempt in Bagwell:
* "[T]he contempt power uniquely is 'liable to abuse."' 90
* "[C]ivil contempt proceedings leave the offended judge solely
responsible for identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanc-
tioning the contumacious conduct." 9'
* "Contumacy 'often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qual-
ities of a judge's temperament' "92 . . . "and its fusion of legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial powers 'summons forth. . .the
prospect of 'the most tyrannical licentiousness. "93
The Court in Bagwell did not provide any examples of what length
of imprisonment for civil contempt would, or even could, violate the
Due Process Clause.94 Neither did it mention the Due Process Clause in
connection with its allowing "indefinite" imprisonment. To the extent
these may be envisioned as two aircraft, their flight plans neither
allowed them to converge nor land.
In Turner v. Rogers,95 the Court recently decided another case on
civil contempt. While it did refer to Bagwell on a more general issue,9 6
its facts9 7 were not conducive to the Court re-examining its "indefinitely
88. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (emphasis added).
89. See infra at Section V.
90. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831 (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968)).
91. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831.
92. Id. (citing Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202).
93. Id. (citing Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 822 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
95. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
96. Id. at 2521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing to Bagwell in connection with courts'
traditional assumption of "inherent contempt authority").
97. Id. at 2520. After being incarcerated five times in three years for failure to make his
payments, including completing a six-month sentence, Turner was held in contempt a sixth time
and sentenced to one year in jail. The issue before the Court was whether the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause required a state to provide counsel at a civil contempt hearing
(for failure to pay child support) to Turner, an indigent person. The answer was a qualified "no."
The Court held that the provision of counsel is not automatically required by the Due Process
clause, provided that sufficient alternative safeguards are provided, such as, e.g., adequate notice
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until he complies" language.
For Chadwick, timing was everything. With the Supreme Court
having decided Bagwell" in 1994, one year before he was imprisoned,
in any federal court in which he might seek habeas corpus relief he faced
(1) truly indefinite confinement," (2) without the right to a jury trial,oe
(3) without the requirement to sustain his imprisonment of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt,101 or, (4) a finding of willful refusal to comply on
his part,10 2 and (5) with the burden resting on him to prove impossible
his compliance with the order. 1 0 3 Moreover, factual findings made by
the courts of Pennsylvania would be presumed correct, and he would be
required to show by clear and convincing evidence that they were not. 04
Pennsylvania law, because Chadwick was imprisoned by its state
court order, would directly bear on any state court habeas corpus relief
he would seek, and indirectly in federal court.105 But, would it help or
hurt?
IV. PENNSYLVANIA LAW OF CIVIL CONTEMPT
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, in Commonwealth v. Mar-
of the importance of the ability to pay and a fair opportunity to present and dispute relevant
information and court findings. Id.
98. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821.
99. Id.
100. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
101. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827.
102. See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949):
The absence of willfulness does not relieve one from civil contempt. Civil as
distinguished from criminal contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with an
order of the court or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason of
noncompliance. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04;
Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 330 U.S. 585, 590; Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 68. Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent
the defendant did the prohibited act. The decree was not fashioned so as to grant or
withhold its benefits dependent on the state of mind of respondents. It laid on them a
duty to obey specified provisions of the statute. An act does not cease to be a
violation of a law and of a decree merely because it may have been done innocently.
The force and vitality of judicial decrees derive from more robust sanctions.
103. See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983):
In a civil contempt proceeding such as this, of course, a defendant may assert a
present inability to comply with the order in question. Maggio v. Zeitz, supra, at
75-76; Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 366 (1929). While the court is bound by the
enforcement order, it will not be blind to evidence that compliance is now factually
impossible. Where compliance is impossible, neither the moving party nor the court
has any reason to proceed with the civil contempt action. It is settled, however, that
in raising this defense, the defendant has a burden of production. McPhaul v. United
States, 364 U.S. 372, 379 (1960); Maggio v. Zeitz, supra, at 75-76; Oriel v. Russell,
supra, at 366.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2010).
105. See discussion infra at Sections IV and V.
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cone, that civil contempt "has as its dominant purpose to enforce com-
pliance with an order of court for the benefit of the party in whose favor
the order runs." 0 6 It termed the power to punish for contempt to be a
"right inherent in courts and incidental to the grant of judicial power
under Article 5 of our Constitution."o' Its exercise is regulated by 42
Pa. C.S.A. § 4132 (2011), which states:
The power of the several courts of this Commonwealth to issue
attachments and to impose summary punishments for contempts of
court shall be restricted to the following cases:
(1) The official misconduct of the officers of such courts
respectively.
(2) Disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses
of or to the lawful process of the court.
(3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court,
thereby obstructing the administration of justice.os
Where civil contempt is concerned, the distinguishing characteristic
"is the ability of the contemnor to purge himself .. . by complying with
the court's directive.""0 ' And, "a court may not convert a coercive sen-
tence into a punitive one by imposing conditions that a contemnor can-
not perform and thereby purge himself of contempt." "0 If the order is
punitive, then the matter is criminal contempt which would require "the
essential procedural safeguards that attend criminal proceedings
generally." "
Unlike in federal court, where the burden of showing noncompli-
ance with an order requires clear and convincing evidence," 2 a com-
plaining party in Pennsylvania need only show noncompliance by a
preponderance of the evidence." 3 Present inability to comply is an
affirmative defense borne by the alleged contemnor,114 but in Penn-
sylvania, "the court, in imposing coercive imprisonment for civil con-
tempt, should set conditions for purging the contempt and effecting
release from imprisonment with which it is convinced beyond a reason-
106. Commonwealth v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759, 762 (Pa. 1980).
107. Id. at 763.
108. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4232 (West 2011); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4133
(West 2011) ("[T]he punishment of commitment for contempt provided in section 4132 (relating
to attachment and summary punishment for contempts) shall extend only to contempts committed
in open court. All other contempts shall be punished by fine only.").
109. Wetzel v. Suchanek, 541 A.2d 761, 763 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (citing Janet D. v. Carros,
362 A.2d 1060 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1976)).
110. Wetzel, 541 A.2d at 763 (citing Barrett v. Barrett, 368 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1977)).
111. Wetzel, 541 A.2d at 764 (quoting In re Martorano, 346 A.2d 22, 29 (Pa. 1975)).
112. See, e.g., FTC v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 754 (10th Cir. 2004); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 950 F.2d 1525, 1529 (1lth Cir. 1992).
113. Barrett, 368 A.2d at 621.
114. Id.
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able doubt, from the totality of the evidence before it, the contemnor has
the present ability to comply.""'
Had Chadwick been charged with civil contempt in federal court,
his burden would have been higher because he would have had to prove
"categorically and in detail" why he could not comply with the condi-
tions in the order,1 16 or, put another way, that it was impossible for him
to comply."' In Pennsylvania, rather, the court could not impose condi-
tions to begin with unless it had evidence showing beyond a reasonable
doubt that Chadwick could comply with them. With this seemingly cru-
cial factor in his favor, the road should have been made easier for him. It
was counterbalanced, however, by one fact. Nothing in Pennsylvania
law, whether constitutional, statutory or precedential, shed light on what
would or even should constitute an endpoint for imprisonment for civil
contempt.118
V. FOURTEEN YEARS AT SEA IN THE FEDERAL AND
PENNSYLVANIA COURTS
A. 1995 to 1999: No Nearer to the Shore
On April 7, 1995, only two days after his arrest, Chadwick filed an
emergency motion in federal court seeking his release from prison and
the vacation of the bench warrant that led to his arrest."' 9 Because he did
not "adequately aver that he will have no opportunity to raise and have a
timely decision by a competent state tribunal," his motion was denied
under the Younger abstention doctrine without prejudice to his filing a
subsequent timely habeas corpus petition.120 So began his nearly two
dozen appearances in the trial and appellate courts of both Pennsylvania
and the United States.
* Chadwick v. Hill'2 1 - In September 1995, Chadwick moved for
115. Id.
116. NLRB v. Trans Ocean Exp. Packing, Inc., 473 F.2d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing In re
Byrd Coal Co., Inc., 83 F.2d 256 (2nd Cir. 1936)).
117. See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983).
118. Although the Pennsylvania Constitution does not have a "due process" clause per se, Art.
I, §9 has been "commonly referred to as the due process clause of our constitution." See
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 713 A.2d 596, 600 (Pa. 1998). Both by its title, "Rights of accused in
criminal prosecution," and its terms, beginning with "In all criminal prosecutions," it appears
clearly inapplicable to civil contempt. No reported Chadwick decision has held otherwise.
119. Chadwick v. Delaware Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, No. 95-MC-0103, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5130, at *1 (E.D. Pa. April 19, 1995). Judge Shapiro later counted this as the first of
Chadwick's federal habeas petitions. See Chadwick v. Janecka, No. 00-1130, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2002).
120. Chadwick v. Delaware Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, No. 95-MC-0 103, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5130, at *9 (E.D. Pa. April 19, 1995) (discussing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
121. No. 95-0103, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13081 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1995).
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injunctive or, in the alternative, habeas corpus relief. By then, his second
habeas petition in state trial court had been denied. Because there
already was an appeal pending in the state Superior Court, Federal Dis-
trict Court Judge Norma Shapiro denied his motion for failure to exhaust
state court remedies.
* Chadwick v. Hilll2 2 - In January 1997, again before Judge Sha-
piro, 12 3 Chadwick filed his third federal habeas petition. He claimed,
after having been in jail for two years, that his incarceration violated the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process because the
order "is no longer coercive, but has reached a punitive stage."124 By
this time Chadwick had filed six state habeas petitions, three of which
were still pending on appeal, including two that had been consolidated
and were in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 125 Because he had not
exhausted his state court remedies, his petition was dismissed. Any issue
regarding the applicability of Bagwell was not reached.
* Chadwick v. Hill1 2 6 - On April 8, 1997, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied without comment Chadwick's Petition for Allow-
ance of Appeal. His petition for certiorari was then denied by the United
States Supreme Court. 127
* Chadwick v. Andrewsl 28 - In December 1997, his motion in fed-
eral court for release on bail pending determination of his July 1997
habeas petition was denied. The court held that relief on bail normally is
granted only where (1) the sentence is short, such that the petitioner's
entire sentence would run before relief could be obtained; or, (2) the
petitioner is gravely ill. The first did not apply because Chadwick was
not serving a definite sentence. As to the second, although he had lym-
phoma it had been in remission for fifteen years. Therefore, his condi-
tion was not "grave."
The court noted that following the trial court's denial of Chad-
wick's sixth state petition for habeas relief he appealed to the Superior
Court, which affirmed on April 23, 1997, and "specifically invited the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review its decision to clarify the point
under state law at which a coercive penalty for civil contempt becomes a
criminal sanction, but Mr. Chadwick did not seek review of that Supe-
122. No. 96-6426, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 512 (E.D. Pa. Jan 16, 1997).
123. Unless otherwise noted herein, Judge Shapiro presided through the years over each of
Chadwick's habeas petitions filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
124. Hill, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 512, at *2.
125. Id. at *4.
126. No. 0774, 1997 Pa. LEXIS 717 (Pa. Apr. 8, 1997).
127. Chadwick v. Andrews, 522 U.S. 864 (1997).
128. No. 97-4680, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20506 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1997).
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rior Court decision." 12 9 This invitation, in a memorandum opinion, was
phrased as follows:
Instantly, appellant cites to the fact that he has been incarcerated
since April 5, 1995. He claims the length of his incarceration, his age,
poor health, inability to pursue his career and repeated hearings
where he has refused compliance suggests that there is no possibility
that he will comply with the order. Appellant admits that no court in
this jurisdiction has adopted this test and we will not do so here.
While it seems reasonable that at some point a temporal benchmark
should be adopted to determine when contempt incarceration
becomes impermissibly punitive we think that it is for our high court
to make such a determination.13 0
No rationale for this decision appears in any reported case. That
Chadwick, litigating in every other available forum, would choose not to
attempt to have the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rule on this crucial
issue, when its lower court had invited it to, and it could have set him
free, makes little sense. Had he done so, he might have severely cut
short his imprisonment. After all, this was still 1997-not 2009.
* Chadwick v. Andrewsl3 ' - In April 1998, Chadwick again sought
habeas relief in federal court (his fourth attempt). As he had argued in
January 1997, his continued incarceration, now three years long, served
only a punitive purpose. Therefore, he reasoned, since he was "no longer
imprisoned for civil contempt [he] . . . must be afforded the protections
and procedures available before criminal sanctions are imposed."l 32
Chadwick's earlier decision to not seek review in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court came back to haunt him, when the court dismissed his
petition and held he had failed to exhaust his state remedies:
Because Mr. Chadwick failed to seek review in the Supreme Court
from the denial of his sixth state habeas petition, he has not fully
exhausted his available state remedies and this court cannot yet enter-
tain his petition for federal habeas corpus.... When civil contempt
becomes impermissibly punitive should not be considered by this
court until the Supreme Court has had the opportunity, especially
where the state's intermediate appellate court specifically requested
the Supreme Court to determine when confinement for civil contempt
becomes punitive and requires due process protections.' 3 3
129. Id. at *4.
130. See Chadwick v. Janecka, No. 00-CV-1130, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21732, at *14-15
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2000) (quoting the Superior Court's invitation to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court); see also discussion infra at Section V.
131. No. 97-4680, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6123 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 1998). -
132. Id. at *7.
133. Id. at *15. In 2000, Chadwick sought to eliminate the procedural bar of "failure to exhaust
state remedies" in an unusual way. As described by a later court, he filed his "pro se Application
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* Chadwick v. Andrews"' - The court denied his motion for recon-
sideration of its denial of his April 1998 petition.
B. 2000 to 2002: Ithaca in Sight
* Chadwick v. Janecka3 5 - On Chadwick's fifth federal habeas
petition, filed in March 2000, when he had been in prison for almost five
years, the court by and through its magistrate's report and recommenda-
tions of December 8, 2000, finally reached the substance of his due pro-
cess claims. Because the state court's factual findings were presumed to
be correct,136 in order to prevail Chadwick had to show "that the state
court decision was contrary to clearly established case law by the United
States Supreme Court, or alternatively, that the state court's decision
was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court case law."'
Chadwick particularly relied on Bagwell, arguing that so far as due
process was concerned the Supreme Court had changed the analysis
from whether it was criminal or civil contempt to the seriousness of the
penalty. Because his penalty had become serious, he argued, he was
entitled to a jury trial with the criminal standard on the burden of proof.
Finally, he repeated his ongoing argument that the length of his impris-
onment had "transformed the purpose of the sanction from coercion to
punishment."13 8
The magistrate recommended that Chadwick's habeas petition be
denied. After a thorough examination of the facts in Bagwell, he distin-
guished it in the following ways:
1. The punishment in Chadwick's case was imprisonment, not
based on fines as in Bagwell.
2. Chadwick could have purged himself of his contempt at any time
by complying with the court order. "The fact that the petitioner
has now served sixty-seven months in the Delaware County
Prison is no fault of anyone but the petitioner himself."
3. The payment of marital funds Chadwick was ordered to make
was not punitive, but compensatory.13 9
for Leave to File Original Process (his seventh state habeas petition) with the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania," asserting "that he had been denied due process of law and his continued
incarceration had ceased to be coercive but was punitive. This request was granted on February 8,
2000; the petition for habeas corpus was summarily denied on the same date." Chadwick v.
Janecka, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2002); see also Chadwick v. Goldberg,
No. 223 Misc. 1999 (Pa. Feb. 8, 2000).
134. No. 97-4680, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8446 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1998).
135. No. 00-CV-l 130, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21732 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2000).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2006).
137. Janecka, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21732, at *29 (quoting Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d
87, 90 (3d Cir. 1996)).
138. Id. at *33.
139. Id. at *38-39.
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As to Chadwick's argument that he was denied due process because
of his indefinite and unlimited imprisonment for civil contempt, which
by the time of his report was sixty-eight months, the magistrate stated:
"If the petitioner's position were adopted by this Court, any contemnor
could merely be stubborn and wait for sufficient time to pass, thus
avoiding compliance with legitimate court orders with impunity. This is
not an acceptable result."14 0 In his report, however, the magistrate
neither defined nor discussed what amount of time would ever be
"sufficient."
* Chadwick v. Janeckal' 4 1 - In January 2002, more than a year after
receiving his report, Judge Shapiro ruled on what was Chadwick's fifth
federal habeas petition before her. She provided a detailed history of
Chadwick's case filings, including but not limited to these five and his
eight state habeas petitions. 14 2 She then rejected the magistrate's report
in material part, granted Chadwick's petition for habeas corpus, and held
that his continued imprisonment for civil contempt, after nearly seven
years, had become impermissibly punitive.
The court acknowledged the following from the outset:
1. Chadwick still had the present ability to comply with the order,
and provide the marital funds to the court for equitable distribu-
tion. "The record below clearly demonstrates that the state court
findings were not erroneous. This court is convinced that Chad-
wick has the present ability to comply with the July 22, 1994
order."' 4 3
2. His refusals to allow the funds to be investigated without his first
being released from custody gave credence to the fact that he did
not want them found.
3. Upon his release, he could hide them and prevent them from
being provided to the court or his wife."
The court then framed the issue as follows:
After what is now nearly seven years' incarceration for failure to
140. Id. at *41-42.
141. No. 00-1130, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2002).
142. This opinion appears to contain the most exhaustive and detailed history of Chadwick's
legal efforts up to 2002. Of particular interest to the reader may be the following: (1) the trial
court's repeated findings that he had the ability to comply with the court order; (2) its offer to
Chadwick, that a retired judge would be appointed as guardian to trace the assets at issue,
Chadwick would provide all necessary information and materials to assist in the effort, and that
once the guardian certified that Chadwick had fully cooperated and he had the information
necessary to conclude his investigation, Chadwick would be freed; Chadwick would not agree to
the last condition; (3) that twice in August, 1995 Chadwick declined to provide his authorization
to permit third parties to investigate the status of his assets, or, to permit the IRS to release his
1993 tax return; and (4) repeated state trial and appellate rulings that his imprisonment had not
lost its coercive effect.
143. Janecka, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at *19.
144. Id. at *20.
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comply, there is a serious question whether confinement is still serv-
ing a coercive purpose. After this significant period of time, there
exists more than Chadwick's mere assertion that further confinement
will not coerce compliance. The state courts have repeatedly deter-
mined that Chadwick's incarceration has not lost its coercive force.
This court must determine whether that conclusion is contrary to
Supreme Court precedent, and if not, whether it is an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent. 145
Notwithstanding the findings of the state courts, the court here
found that the coercive force had been lost. As Judge Shapiro phrased it
after having ruled on Chadwick's petitions since 1995:
His obstinacy during more than six and a half years of imprisonment
is persuasive that Chadwick will never voluntarily deposit the dis-
puted funds with the court; it seems clear he is willing to remain
incarcerated for life rather than allow his ex-wife access to a share of
the funds. 146
Accordingly, the court first held that his "continued incarceration
cannot be rationalized under Gompers or Bagwell in light of Chadwick's
clear and convincing proof there is no 'substantial likelihood' that his
remaining in custody will result in his compliance; his confinement, no
longer coercive, is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court prece-
dent." 47 Second, as to due process, "after such an extensive time period,
Chadwick cannot remain incarcerated without the due process attendant
to imposition of criminal sanctions." 4 8 In so ruling, the court relied on
Zadvydas v. Davis, where the Supreme Court held that an alien, pending
deportation, could be held for up to six months, but not indefinitely,
without due process protections of a criminal proceeding. 149
In addition to what it perceived to be pertinent Supreme Court pre-
cedent, the court specifically relied on a prior holding of the Third Cir-
cuit, In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Braun)."'o This reliance,
it would turn out, was misplaced.'
The court concluded its opinion with the following:
For eighty months, Chadwick has refused to comply with a valid state
court order to deposit $ 2,500,000.00 in marital assets with the court;
this renders unreasonable the belief that continued incarceration will
145. Id. at *21(intemal citations omitted).
146. Id. at *22.
147. Id. at *23.
148. Id. This included, as the court noted at *24 n.6, the right to counsel, proof of contempt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and, if the sanction involved more than six months' incarceration, the
right to trial by jury.
149. Id. at *24 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)).
150. Id. at *15.
151. See discussion infra at Section V (C).
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have a coercive effect. Chadwick has the present ability to comply,
but the duration of his imprisonment has crossed the line from coer-
cive to punitive, and requires his release. Chadwick should be
afforded due process in any proceeding to impose additional criminal
sanctions.152
H. Beatty Chadwick was a free man. Or, so it seemed. One thing
missing from the court's opinion, as well as one line at its end, would
prove telling. As to the former, the court, unlike its magistrate, gave
exceedingly short shrift to Bagwell.15 1 It narrowly relied on this
Supreme Court holding for its statement of the main differences between
civil and criminal contempt, which had not changed since Gompers.154 It
did not, however, discuss Bagwell regarding (1) its statement that civil
contempt will extend "indefinitely until he complies," (2) how it may
have spoken to due process ramifications for contempt that had purport-
edly turned from coercive to punitive, or (3) at what point that might
be.' 5 As to the latter, the court stated: "This order is stayed and Chad-
wick shall remain in state custody for thirty (30) days to allow appeal
and application for further stay of this court's order to the appellate
court." 5 6
C. Bagwell In The Hands Of The Third Circuit: The Winds
Blow Away From Ithaca
Mrs. Chadwick appealed the district court's order releasing Chad-
wick to the Third Circuit.' And, in Chadwick v. Janecka, in an opinion
written by Judge (now Justice) Alito on de novo review, the court
reversed. 118
The heart of the opinion was whether the lower court ruling met the
requirements of habeas corpus relief, particularly whether its finding that
the state court's keeping him imprisoned, was (1) "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," '15 or (2) was
"based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding." 60
152. Janecka, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at *25-26.
153. See generally, id. at *14-23.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Id. at *27.
157. Chadwick was not released in the interim. As noted by the court, Mrs. Chadwick had
moved for a stay pending appeal, which was granted on January 31, 2002. The United States
Supreme Court then denied Chadwick's Application for Enlargement and to Vacate Stay.
158. 312 F. 3d 597, 605 (3d Cir. 2002).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2006).
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In determining the first issue, the court went straight to Bagwell.'6'
Chadwick argued that its phrase "indefinitely until he complies" did not
mean "permanently and without other recourse," but rather meant "with
no pre-determined ending date." 62 The court had "no quarrel" with this
definition, but stated that this did not explain away the critical statement
that a civil contemnor may be confined "indefinitely until he com-
plies."16 3 The court contrasted the dictionary definition of "indefinitely,"
meaning, "having no exact limits," with Chadwick's "contrary interpre-
tation," that "indefinitely until he complies" means "indefinitely until he
complies or it becomes apparent that he is never going to comply"-an
interpretation it termed "insupportable."164
The court then turned to Maggio v. Zeitz, the case chiefly relied on
by Chadwick, to show that his position was "clearly established" in
Supreme Court law.165 Maggio was the principal of a bankrupt camera
shop who was imprisoned for civil contempt for not complying with a
"turnover order" directing him to return property wrongfully taken from
the debtor.166 Chadwick relied on two sentences therein: "It is every-
where admitted that even if [the contemnor] is committed, he will be
held in jail forever if he does not comply. His denial of possession is
given credit after demonstration that a period in prison does not produce
the goods." 67
The court took great pains over four pages to distinguish Maggio,
and support its conclusion that "Maggio focuses on the question of abil-
ity to comply, not willingness to comply-and Mr. Chadwick's ability to
comply has not been challenged in the present proceeding and is not at
issue."'
The court then distinguished its prior holding in In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Appeal of Braun), relied on by the District Court, finding
that it too contrasted sharply with Mr. Chadwick's understanding of
Maggio because it also focused on one's ability to comply, not one's
willingness.169
As to the second possible basis for habeas relief, that the state
court's decision was "based on an unreasonable determination of the
161. Janecka, 312 F.3d at 607-08 (citing International Union, United Mine Workers of
America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994)).
162. Janecka, 312 F.3d at 608.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1147 (1971)).
165. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948).
166. Janecka, 312 F.3d at 609 n.9.
167. Id. at 611. (citing Maggio, 333 U.S. at 76).
168. Id. at 609-13.
169. Idat 612 n.13 (discussing Mr. Chadwick's reliance on In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Appeal of Braun), 600 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1979)).
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facts""o there was no issue as the "District Court acknowledged that the
record demonstrates that the state court findings were not erroneous, and
... it was 'convinced that Mr. Chadwick has the present ability to com-
ply with the July 22, 1994 order.' "171
The court concluded with the following, a literal holding and inter-
pretation of Bagwell that, even presuming one can comply, permits end-
less (not apparently excluding life) imprisonment for civil contempt:
The Supreme Court has never endorsed the proposition that confine-
ment for civil contempt must cease when there is 'no substantial like-
lihood of compliance.' On the contrary, in words that might as well
have been written to describe the case now before us, the Bagwell
Court stated that 'the paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction
. . . involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until he complies
with an affirmative command such as an order 'to pay alimony, or to
surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver.'172
The court felt "no need . . . to decide whether In re Grand Jury
Investigation remains good law in light of Bagwell. It is enough for pre-
sent purposes that the state court decisions cannot be disturbed under the
restricted standard of review applicable in this habeas case."'17  The
court never discussed the practical ramifications of its holding or any of
the risks associated with civil contempt that even Justice Blackmun took
pains to note in Bagwell.174 Chadwick would therefore remain in prison,
and the Supreme Court would not intervene. 7
D. 2003 to 2008: No Relief And Notwithstanding The
Report Of The Special Master
In September 2002, while his appeal to the Third Circuit was pend-
ing, Chadwick returned to the state courts in Chadwick v. Caulfield to
file his ninth habeas petition.176 It was denied, with both the trial and
appellate courts finding first that most of his issues had been previously
raised and rejected. As to Chadwick's argument that "incarceration may
become punitive where 'the contemnor has shown there is no realistic
possibility or a substantial likelihood that continued confinement will
ever accomplish its coercive purpose,"17 7 the court reiterated its prior
170. Id. at 607.
171. Id. at 612 (quoting Chadwick v. Janecka, No. 00-1130, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at *19
(E.D. Pa. Jan 3, 2002)).
172. Id. at 613 (citing International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512
U.S. 821, 828 (1994)).
173. Janecka, 312 F.3d at 613.
174. See discussion supra at Section III.
175. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1000 (2003).
176. 834 A.2d 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
177. Id. at 569.
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holding (and invitation to Chadwick) that it was for the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to define "when contempt incarceration becomes imper-
missibly punitive."' It noted further that Chadwick "did not appeal to
our supreme court from the denial of his sixth petition for habeas
relief."'7 9 He did, however, petition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
take an appeal from this decision and the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari. Both were denied.s18
Chadwick returned in 2003 to federal court and Judge Shapiro for
his sixth habeas petition there, in Chadwick v. Caulfield."' Unlike the
temporary success he enjoyed on his fifth federal petition,18 2 this peti-
tion was dismissed. The court found it to be a "second or successive
habeas corpus application" within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act,18 1 which first required permission from the
Third Circuit for the District Court to consider it.184 As the Third Circuit
had earlier stated in reversing the District Court, "[o]ur decision does not
preclude Mr. Chadwick from filing a new federal habeas petition if he
claims that he is unable for some reason to comply with the state court's
order."' However, as the District Court found, "[t]he petitioner com-
plains of procedural inadequacies in determining his past ability to pay,
already rejected by this court and the Court of Appeals, but he still does
not allege he is actually unable to pay."18 6 The result was dismissal.
In 2004, the ninth year of Chadwick's imprisonment, and with his
agreement, the trial court appointed a former Chief Judge of the Dela-
ware County Court of Common Pleas as a Special Master with limited
authority to "investigate, search and obtain any and all information
regarding the monies transferred out of the United States by H. Beatty
Chadwick, and which is subject to the court order of July 22, 2004."ml8
In his October 3, 2005, report, the Master found that Chadwick "does
not possess or control the secreted assets and accordingly does not have
the ability to comply with the July 22, 1994, order and should be
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Chadwick v. Caulfield, 853 A.2d 359 (Pa. 2004); Chadwick v. Caulfield, 834 A.2d 562
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 875 (2004).
181. No. 03-4793, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23269 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2003).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 145-60.
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006).
184. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2006); see also Caulfield, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23269 at
*9.
185. Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 614 (3d Cir. 2002).
186. Caulfield, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23269 at *7.
187. See Chadwick v. Hill, No. 06-1709, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34431, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
25, 2008) (discussing his tenth state habeas proceeding as well as the report and recommendations
of the Special Master).
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released from his present incarceration.""'
Relying on this report, Chadwick in 2005 filed his tenth state peti-
tion for habeas relief. A panel of the trial court issued what can only be
described as judicially excoriating Findings of Fact, followed by its
order striking the Master's report in its entirety and denying his peti-
tion.' 89 The court found that the Master "far exceeded the scope of his
authority ... in making any findings whatsoever regarding the propriety
of defendant Chadwick's continued incarceration,"190 and listed numer-
ous other defects in his report. As to Chadwick, who given his agree-
ment to the appointment in his ninth year of imprisonment was expected
to cooperate with the Master, the court found that he (1) refused to coop-
erate in general; (2) refused to sign authorizations enabling the Master to
obtain relevant information; and (3) "specifically refused to sign nar-
rowly drafted authorizations directing the release of billing information
from the multiple attorneys whose services he has retained."' 9 '
In his seventh federal habeas petition, in 2008, Chadwick again
relied on the Special Master's report. 92 The court recited some of the
report's findings, and many more of its defects listed by the trial
court.193 Because the report had been stricken in its entirety, the court
found that it was "void under Pennsylvania law, of no probative value,
188. Id.
189. Id. at *18-22.
190. Id. at *20.
191. Id. at * 19. The Chadwick cases cited in this article reflect a number of attorneys appearing
as counsel for him throughout the years. Although he at times appeared pro se, as the reader will
logically assume, unless they were all appearing pro bono, the attorneys' fees and costs for
representing him in his efforts to gain his freedom had to have been significant. The only available
point of reference is the trial court's finding that prior to commencement of trial in his divorce
proceeding, Mrs. Chadwick had incurred approximately $1,900,000.00 in fees and costs. Of this
amount, her counsel estimated that sixty percent, or some $1,140,000.00, was incurred in litigation
relating to his failure to come forward with the money. See Chadwick v. Chadwick, 68 Pa. D. &
C. 4th 369, 392 (C.P. Ct. Del. Cnty., Pa. Oct. 27, 2004). Moreover, Chadwick was involved in
significant additional litigation since 1995 in which he which he appeared both pro se and through
counsel. See Chadwick v. Metro Corp., 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003) (rejecting Chadwick's attempt
to obtain interlocutory review of dismissal and stay orders in his suit against three parties,
including Mrs. Chadwick, for defamation, invasion of privacy and conspiracy to injure his
reputation); Chadwick v. Chadwick, No. CIV-03-30-P-C, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9957 (D.C. Me.
June 12, 2003) (dismissing Chadwick's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against Mrs. Chadwick for false
imprisonment, abuse of process and conversion); Chadwick v. Metro Corp., 856 A.2d 1066 (Del.
2004) (affirming on full appeal dismissal of Chadwick's claims against Mrs. Chadwick, et al, for
defamation, invasion of privacy and conspiracy to injure his reputation); Chadwick v. Court of
Common Pleas, No. 05-1443, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40125 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2006) (denying
Chadwick's 42 U.S.C. §1983 motion challenging the conditions of his imprisonment due to his
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma); Chadwick v. Court of Common Pleas, 244 Fed. Appx. 451 (3d Cir.
2007) (affirming denial of his 42 U.S.C. §1983 motion). No reported case mentions the source of
money paid to his attorneys.
192. Hill, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34431 at *7.
193. Id. at *7-8.
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and cannot be credited as clearly convincing evidence or any evidence
whatsoever."' 94 Chadwick's reliance thereon accordingly failed, and his
petition was denied; and reflecting Judge Shapiro's understanding of
what the Third Circuit had told her six years earlier about civil contempt
being limitless, she concluded her opinion by stating:
Chadwick has had the opportunity to establish his inability to comply
but has refused to provide the information about his bank accounts
and access to those off-shore accounts that would permit an objective
trier of fact to reach an informed conclusion as to his actual ability or
inability to turn over the funds. It is clear from the well-reasoned
state court opinions that nothing other than full compliance or com-
plete candor establishing an inability to comply will purge the peti-
tioner of his contempt.' 95
E. Freedom, Notwithstanding
On Friday afternoon, July 10, 2009, Judge Joseph Cronin of the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas signed an order freeing H.
Beatty Chadwick.' 96 Within an hour, he left prison. In his ruling, Judge
Cronin stated that he:
concurs with the prior presiding judges . . . who conclude[ ] that peti-
tioner Chadwick has the ability to comply with the court order of July
22, 1994, but that he had willfully refused to do so. This court con-
cludes that petitioner Chadwick continues to willfully disobey the
court order. . . . [I]n order to be lawful, the petitioner's confinement
for civil contempt of court must have a coercive effect. However, if
during the period of civil incarceration a court concludes that future
imprisonment will not induce compliance, the imprisonment is no
longer coercive, becomes punitive and the petitioner must be
released.' 97
Albert Momjian, Mrs. Chadwick's'98 longtime attorney, filed
motions that Friday to delay Chadwick's release but he was not
successful.'"
194. Id. at *26-27.
195. Id. at *27-28.
196. Marlene DiGiacomo, Judge Finally Sets Former Lawyer Free After 14 Years, Di AWARI
COUNTY DAnY TIMais, July 11, 2009, http://www.delcotimes.com/articles/2009/07/1 I/news/doc
4a57fealb39ed606977003.txt.; see also Lawyer is Released After Serving Over 14 Years on Civil
Contempt Charge, N.Y. TIMis, July 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/us/12
contempt.html?.
197. DiGiacomo, supra note 196.
198. For the sake of continuity, throughout this article the author has called her by her original
married name. She has remarried and is legally known as Barbara Applegate. See Chadwick v.
Metro Corp., McDougall, & Barbara Chadwick a/k/a Barbara Applegate, 822 A.2d 396 (Del.
2003).
199. DiGiacomo, supra note 196.
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In November, 2010 a reporter for the Philadelphia Inquirer found a
Match.com post by "beattychad." 2 " The profile said he was fifty-four, a
lawyer who earns $150,000 a year, "athletic and toned," and was
"seek(ing) a 'slender' younger gal interested in summering on a lake in
Michigan with a cultured sugar daddy."2 0 1
When asked if he was "beattychad", Chadwick said yes.202 He was
seventy-four at the time, however, not fifty-four. And, he was not a law-
yer, having had his license suspended. 203 As to the former, he joked, "I
didn't count the years I spent in jail." 2 0" As to the latter he said, "I don't
know why [the dating profile he created] would say I was making a lot
of money."20 5
When reached for comment on her ex's "role-playing," Barbara
"Bobbie" Applegate said, "Unbelievable! . . . He's sick. He's crazy.
He's always been a person who didn't have to live by the rules."206
When reached for his comment, Albert Momjian said, "We've had him
back in court since his release, . . . [w]e've asked for his tax returns.
He's still not cooperating. . . . I would imagine that $2.5 million grew,
wherever it was, . . . we're going to get that money. . . . I'd do anything
to get him back in jail."2 07
200. Monica Yant Kinney, Beatty Chadwick, Trolling Match.com, Still Defying Truth,




203. Id.; see also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Chadwick, 874 A.2d 1142 (Pa. 2005)
(suspending his Pennsylvania law license for five years, and requiring him to "comply with all the
provisions of Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E."); In re Chadwick, 6 A.3d 1284 (D.C. 2010) (suspending his
license to practice law in the District of Columbia for five years with a fitness requirement); In re
Chadwick, 285 Fed. App'x. 974, 975 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming suspension of his right to practice
law in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for five years).
204. Kinney, supra note 200.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. As part of the court's findings of fact in the Chadwicks' divorce case, the court
determined after hearing from a certified public accountant (who was qualified as an expert in
security valuation) the current value of the missing $2,500,000. See Chadwick v. Chadwick, 68
Pa. D. & C. 4th 369, 382-83 (C.P. Ct. Del. Cnty., Pa. Oct. 27, 2004). If it had been conservatively
invested on January 31, 1993, in 3-month T-bills, compounded quarterly, as of April 30, 2004, it
would have had a value of almost $8,200,000 before taxes. Of this amount, 65.27 percent (with
the remainder constituting the value of Chadwick's IRA's) was available for equitable
distribution, or approximately $5,700,000. Assuming only a 4% uncompounded growth rate from
then until 2011, its total value before taxes would be approximately $10,500,000, with
approximately $6,800,000 available for equitable distribution. More detailed calculations, using
available look-back data, would likely show that this figure was in reality higher. Id. at 382-84.
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VI. CATCH-22: CAUGHT BETWEEN RESTRICTIONS ON HABEAS
CORPUS RELIEF AND SILENCE BY THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has stated that, "[t]he moment the courts of the
United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction
over any subject, they became possessed of this power [to punish for
contempt] . . . and to enforce obedience to their lawful orders, judg-
ments, and processes."2 0 8 Given that civil contempt and the Due Process
Clause have therefore coexisted since 1868,20 one would surmise that
federal courts had often seen cases involving contemnors imprisoned for
civil contempt, without a jury trial, who sought their release on due pro-
cess grounds. That is not the case. In 1976, the Ninth Circuit, in Lambert
v. Montana, considered the following to be a "novel question":
"[W]hether due process considerations may affect the duration of con-
finement resulting from a state court's commitment arising from a find-
ing of civil contempt." 2 10
There, defendant had been incarcerated for sixteen months for
refusing to testify concerning the identity of the person who had dis-
charged a weapon in the direction of others. On this "novel question"
raised by defendant, apparently for the first time in the context of federal
civil contempt litigation, the court found:
Lambert's allegation that his continuing commitment for civil con-
tempt violates due process raises a serious constitutional challenge
which requires further proceedings in the district court. Where it is
alleged that the duration of an individual's confinement no longer
bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which he is com-
mitted a substantial federal constitutional claim relating to denial of
due process is present.21
Even though Lambert had, in comparison to Chadwick's fourteen
years, "only" been incarcerated for sixteen months, the court held that:
In view of the length of time that petitioner has remained silent even
though in a custodial situation, there exists a substantial likelihood
that continued confinement is no longer serving its purpose. If this is
true, it may be that the nature and duration of the commitment no
longer bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which Lam-
bert was committed and that, in fact, the commitment has lost its
208. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1873).
209. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
210. 545 F.2d 87, 88 (9th Cir. 1976).
211. Id. at 89. Neither Supreme Court case cited by the Ninth Circuit for this holding
concerned civil contempt. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737-38 (1972) (finding
defendant's indefinite commitment until he was declared to be sane violated his due process
rights), and McNeil v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 257 (1972) (finding defendant's
indefinite incarceration beyond his five-year criminal sentence and until he submitted to
psychological examination was a violation of due process).
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coercive force, and is now punishment falling under the pale of crimi-
212nal contempt.
Accordingly, the court remanded the case for the district court to
determine whether the coercive force had been lost and whether contin-
ued confinement would accomplish the purpose of the original order. In
Chadwick's case, however, his argument that coercive effect had been
lost would be rejected for a very long time.2 13 What was a "novel ques-
tion" in the law in 1976-whether due process could pose a "serious
federal constitutional challenge" to his imprisonment-took almost
larger-than-life form in Chadwick's record-breaking case.2 14
At the outset of discussing the factors that caused this, it is impor-
tant to put in context how severe his imprisonment for fourteen years
without a jury trial truly was. Under Pennsylvania law, had he been con-
victed by a jury of any of the following offenses, and without his having
any prior convictions, the punishment would have been as follows:
i. Murder in the third degree2 15 : First-degree felony punishable by
a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison,216 with a recom-
mended minimum sentence of as little as six years.217
2. Robbery with serious bodily injury218: First-degree felony with a
maximum sentence of twenty years in prison,219 and a recom-
mended minimum of as little as four years to sixty-six months.220
3. Voluntary manslaughter 22 1 : First-degree felony with a maximum
sentence of twenty years in prison, and a recommended mini-
mum of as little as three years to fifty-four months (in boot camp,
not in prison). 222
4. Had Chadwick been convicted of passing a note to a teller at a
bank and threatening the teller to turn over $2,500,000.00 to him,
it would have constituted the crime of robbery, 223 a second-
212. Lambert, 545 F.2d at 90.
213. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 606 (3d Cir. 2002).
214. Schaefer, supra note 6.
215. Defined as "all . . . kinds of murder" (other than) "an intentional killing" or one
committed "while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a
felony". 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(a)-(c) (West 2011).
216. 18 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 1103(1) (West 2011).
217. See 204 PA. Coii: § 303.16 (2011).
218. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701(a)(1)(i) (West 2011).
219. § 1103(1).
220. § 303.16.
221. Defined as "a person who kills an individual without lawful justification ... [and] at the
time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation by: (I) the individual killed; or (2) another whom the actor endeavors to kill, but he
negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
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degree felony22" punishable by up to ten years in prison,2 2 5 and
with a recommended minimum of one to two years in boot
camp.226
5. Had he simply stolen $2,500,000.00 from Mrs. Chadwick, he
would have been guilty of theft of more than $2,000, a third-
degree felony227 punishable by up to seven years in prison,2 28
with a recommended minimum sentence of nine to sixteen
months in boot camp.229
Had Chadwick been charged with any of these offenses and not
entered into a plea bargain, no court could have imprisoned him without
his having been found guilty by a jury based on evidence establishing
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.2 30 In fourteen years in prison for
civil contempt, however, he had the benefit of neither protection.
Instead, the law placed him in a Catch-22 situation facing, at the same
time, too narrow a path to habeas corpus relief in conjunction with what
the Third Circuit believed to be silence by the Supreme Court.2 3 '
A. Habeas Corpus Relief: Too Narrow A Path
Civil contemnors seeking federal habeas corpus relief are strictly
limited as to what grounds may effect their release. They must show that
either (1) the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court"; or (2) its decision was "unreasonable" in
light of the evidence presented to it.2 3 2
Therefore, in seeking their freedom by the first avenue, by defini-
tion civil contemnors, as well as other defendants seeking relief, cannot
rely on a basis grounded in "clearly established law" by even the Circuit
Courts of Appeals, and even if such law is on point and favorable. What
224. § 3701(b).
225. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103(2) (West 2011).
226. § 303.16.
227. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3903(a)(1) (West 2011).
228. § 1103(3).
229. § 303.16.
230. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 908 (Pa. 2011).
231. The phrase "Catch-22" has entered common usage since appearing in Joseph Heller's
well-known novel, CATCH-22 (1961). A "Catch-22" situation was described by Heller as follows:
"There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for one's safety
in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was
crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer
be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane
if he didn't, but if he were sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have
to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to." HELLER, supra, at 46.
232. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
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relief, then, can this avenue ever offer to defendants when the Supreme
Court has been silent as to the basis on which they seek habeas relief?
The answer to this question, according to the Third Circuit in its
2002 decision keeping Chadwick in prison, is, in a word, none.2 3 3
The court's rationale was clear, narrow-and strict:
1. Chadwick was required to show that his argument, that because
his imprisonment had lost its coercive effect it must cease, ran
afoul of Supreme Court precedent.234
2. The Supreme Court had never addressed such an argument,
much less accepted it.235
3. Therefore, the District Court erred in granting habeas relief on
this basis.236
As to the validity of the second point, there is much doubt. While it
is true that the Supreme Court had never directly ruled regarding the
"loss of coercive effect" by the time the Third Circuit ruled against
Chadwick, the Court had already held several times that the hallmark of
civil contempt was its "coercive purpose" (as well as distinguishing it
from criminal contempt).2 3 7 This was more than "an argument"; it was
settled law. Even in Bagwell, the Court stated that "civil contempt sanc-
tions . . . are considered to be coercive .... "238 The crucial question the
Third Circuit would not ask was, if "coercive" effect is the hallmark of
civil contempt as determined by clear Supreme Court precedent, and it is
lost, why would civil contempt not terminate? Had it done so, given the
logical answer, it would have affirmed the District Court's grant of
habeas relief to Chadwick. Instead, the court expended considerable
judicial labor distinguishing Maggio, the Supreme Court case heavily
relied upon by Chadwick. 3
Despite and perhaps because of its reliance on the literal language
233. Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 613 (3d Cir. 2002).
234. The Third Circuit noted that it had held that "decisions by lower federal courts may be
considered only 'as helpful amplifications of Supreme Court precedent,"' and, "'federal courts
may not grant habeas corpus relief based on the state court's failure to adhere to the precedent of a
lower federal court on an issue that the Supreme Court has not addressed."' Id. at 613.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) ("[T]heir sentences were
clearly intended to operate in a prospective manner-to coerce, rather than punish. As such, they
relate to civil contempt."); see also United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S.
258, 303-04 (1947) ("Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may ... be employed for
either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order, and
to compensate the complainant for losses sustained."); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 442 (1917) ("Imprisonment [for civil contempt] . . . is intended to be remedial by
coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do.").
238. International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827
(1994).
239. Janecka, 312 F.3d at 609-13.
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in Bagwell, "indefinitely until he complies," the Court failed to note the
obvious. 24 0 Bagwell would likely never have spoken to the issue of "lost
coercive effect" of imprisonment for the simple reason that the punish-
ment at issue was in the form of non-continuing fines.2 4 ' Because it did
not delve into Bagwell with nearly the effort it did with Maggio, it failed
to measure in a reasonable way, instead of an unduly narrow one,
whether habeas relief for Chadwick was appropriate. In what was a clear
case of extended imprisonment, the court failed to include "lost coercive
effect" or due process as factors in the question it did frame: Did the
state court's keeping him imprisoned involve "an unreasonable applica-
tion of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court"?24 2
Instead, consistent with the spirit and holdings of Gompers,2 43 and
its successor cases on "coercive effect," 2 " the court should have framed
the issue in a way that allowed Chadwick a fair opportunity to obtain
habeas relief, such as:
Did the state court's keeping him imprisoned unreasonably fail to
recognize that coercive effect was a requirement for civil contempt,
as repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, and further fail to deter-
mine that it no longer operated in his case so as to violate his due
process rights?
The Third Circuit treated Chadwick harshly in yet another way.
Only three years earlier, in In re Impounded, it had cited the Second
Circuit opinion in Simkin v. United States with approval for the proposi-
tion that "courts have noted that a District Court's discretion in deter-
mining what process is due to an alleged contemnor is very broad." 24 5 In
Chadwick's case, it reviewed de novo Judge Shapiro's "legal conclu-
sions,"24 6 and noted that the state court findings as to Chadwick's ability
to comply with the order were "not erroneous."24 7 However, it failed to
mention Simkin, In re Impounded, or apply its own approved "very
broad"248 standard to Judge Shapiro's crucial factual finding that:
Now, after nearly seven years, it is no longer reasonable to conclude
Chadwick's continued confinement might still result in compliance
with the July 22, 1994 order. . . . [I]n light of Chadwick's clear and
240. See id. at 613 (quoting Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828).
241. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 837.
242. Janecka, 312 F.3d at 606-07 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000)).
243. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911).
244. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369 n.4 (1966).
245. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Simkin v. United States, 715
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983)).
246. Janecka, 312 F.3d at 605 n.6.
247. Id. at 612.
248. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 159.
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convincing proof there is no "substantial likelihood" that his remain-
ing in custody will result in his compliance; his confinement [is
therefore] no longer coercive . . . .249
Instead, it avoided confronting its own standard as well as the "fac-
tual" nature of this finding by holding that lost coercive effect as bearing
on civil contempt had never been recognized by the Supreme Court.2 50
While it can be argued that the Third Circuit made its ruling under the
"narrow"21 habeas standard of review, (1) it still appears to have been
far too restrictive in its view of the Supreme Court's reliance on "coer-
cive effect," 2 5 2 and, (2) it failed to recognize that its District Court had
such "very broad" discretion 2 53 for very good reason. In Simkin, the
court had held:
A district judge's determination whether a civil contempt sanction
has lost any realistic possibility of having a coercive effect is inevita-
bly far more speculative than his resolution of traditional factual
issues. Since a prediction is involved and since that prediction con-
cerns such uncertain matters as the likely effect of continued confine-
ment upon a particular individual, we think a district judge has
virtually unreviewable discretion both as to the procedure he will use
to reach his conclusion, and as to the merits of his conclusion.254
The Third Circuit neither discussed nor mentioned Simkin in keep-
ing Chadwick in prison. There, the Second Circuit reversed the District
Court's denial of a civil contemnor's release. The following was entirely
consistent with what Chadwick was urging generally as to the limits of
his imprisonment for contempt:
As long as the judge is satisfied that the coercive sanction might yet
produce its intended result, the confinement may continue. But if the
judge is persuaded, after a conscientious consideration of the circum-
stances pertinent to the individual contemnor, that the contempt
power has ceased to have a coercive effect, the civil contempt remedy
should be ended.2 5 5
Although the Third Circuit discussed certain portions of its prior
holding in In re Grand Jury Investigation for the purpose of distinguish-
249. Chadwick v. Janecka, No. 00-1130, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10, at *22-23 (E.D. Pa. Jan 3,
2002).
250. Janecka, 312 F.3d at 613.
251. Id. at 605.
252. See discussion supra notes 231-34.
253. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 159.
254. Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1983).
255. Id. at 37. In Simkin, the civil contemnor was imprisoned for refusing to testify before a
grand jury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1826. It does not appear that he sought his release through
habeas corpus. Instead, he "applied to [the court] for termination of the civil contempt sanction
.... Id. at 36.
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ing it and disapproving the District Court's reliance thereon, it omitted
all of the following:
In recent years a number of courts, when presented with situations
involving indeterminate periods of confinement for civil contempt,
have spoken of an additional constraint upon the civil contempt
power. Because the contemnor's imprisonment is said to be justified
as a coercive measure, these courts have declared that when the con-
finement has lost its coercive force it essentially becomes punitive,
and the contemnor must then be released since it is well established
that criminal penalties may not be imposed in civil contempt
proceedings. 25 6
The court continued in a footnote:
With respect to this new constraint on the civil contempt power, how-
ever, it is not the purpose of the confinement that appears to be con-
trolling . . . so much as the notion that the point has been reached
where further confinement on the basis of a summary proceeding is
abhorrent because the imprisonment is manifestly devoid of coercive
effect. At that point, the label, "punitive," is affixed to the
imprisonment.2 57
Then the court quoted reasoning from the New Jersey Supreme Court:
It is abhorrent to our concept of personal freedom that the process of
civil contempt can be used to jail a person indefinitely, possibly for
life, even though he or she refuses to comply with the court's
order.... The legal justification for commitment for civil contempt is
to secure compliance. Once it appears that the commitment has lost
its coercive power, the legal justification for it ends and further con-
finement cannot be tolerated.258
Moreover, the Third Circuit in Braun actually performed the very
analysis that Chadwick was asking it to make. In Section III of its opin-
ion it undertook to resolve "[tihe often perplexing task of determining
whether the confinement has essentially become punitive" 259 and, in
Section IV it factually determined that it had not. 260 And, it did so
despite the fact that Braun had been imprisoned for less than three
months when he sought his release.
Although the court affirmed the District Court's decision to keep
Braun imprisoned for civil contempt, its discussion highlighted the fact
that due process did have a role to play in its decision. It referred to the
Supreme Court holdings in Jackson and McNeil as "occasions [on which
256. In re Jury Investigation (Appeal of Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 423-24 (3d Cir. 1979).
257. Id. at 424 n.12.
258. Id. at 424 (quoting Cantena v. Seidl, 321 A.2d 225, 228 (N.J. 1974)) (emphasis added).
259. Braun, 600 F.2d at 425.
260. Id. at 427-28.
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the Supreme Court] discuss[ed] the due process implications of contin-
ued, non-punitive confinement in contexts closely related to civil con-
tempt."26 1 It held that "Braun's continued imprisonment-up to a total
of eighteen months-for civil contempt is [not] so devoid of coercive
purpose as to justify . . . holding that such confinement violates due
process."262 And, in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing, it
noted that the Supreme Court had held in Morrissey v. Brewer that
"[o]nce it is determined that due process applies, the question remains
what process is due."2 63
The Third Circuit, in reversing its District Court and keeping Chad-
wick in prison, failed to apply, and barely mentioned, these highly mate-
rial portions of its own prior holding in Braun. Neither did it discuss or
mention the ramifications of its holding in terms of fundamental fair-
ness, "abhorrent" imprisonment without end for civil contempt, or due
process. Had it done so, and not been overly and unfairly narrow as to its
conclusion on the Supreme Court view of "lost coercive effect," it likely
would have instead affirmed the District Court and freed Chadwick.2 64
The second avenue through which Chadwick could have sought
habeas relief, that the state courts had made an "unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts" based on the evidence before it, particularly as to his
ability to comply, was also unavailable to him.2 65 This warrants only
brief mention here, because there was not just sufficient but overwhelm-
ing evidence to show that he had that ability.26 6 Nevertheless, as dis-
cussed herein, had the Third Circuit given him the benefits of its own
and prior Supreme Court holdings, as well as due process, this second
avenue would have been moot.
B. Silence By The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, as noted above, has never specifically ruled on
whether lost coercive effect can provide due process insulation against,
or is even material to, civil contempt.26 7 With its holding in Bagwell that
civil contempt will continue "indefinitely until [one] complies," how-
ever, there is such a need.2 68 Neither in Bagwell nor in its most recently
261. Id. at 424-25 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) and McNeil v. Dir.,
Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972)).
262. Braun, 600 F.2d at 428.
263. Id. at 428 n.27 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 230-34.
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) .
266. See discussion supra Section II.
267. See discussion supra notes 237-39.
268. International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828
(1994).
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decided case involving civil contempt, Turner,2 69 did it have before it
facts which would have given it a fair opportunity to make such a ruling.
Yet, one cannot presume that the Court would permit what the literal
language in Bagwell allows - endless, even life, imprisonment for civil
contempt, without a jury trial or proof showing guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. One has, or ought to have, a difficult time not finding such a
result to be "abhorrent."270
The power of courts to imprison for civil contempt is as old as the
American judicial system.2 7 1 Since the time when the question of
whether due process protections were available in federal court to such
contemnors was "novel,"" no statistics are needed to know that citizens
have been, are now, and will in the future be imprisoned for civil con-
tempt. There is a need for the Court to accept a case involving lost coer-
cive effect, as soon as it has the opportunity, so that others are not
trapped by the same "Catch-22" in which the Third Circuit ensnared
Chadwick. On the one hand, even as one who had the ability to comply
with his court order, habeas relief was available to him only if, accord-
ing to the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court had determined that "lost
coercive effect" and due process could terminate his lengthy imprison-
ment for civil contempt. On the other hand, the Supreme Court had been
silent on the subject.
That putting one in a "Catch-22" is considered unfair cannot be
disputed. That the Third Circuit in particular already knew that putting
one in a "Catch-22" was a problem was evident from its prior holding in
Nami v. Fauver:
In addition, prisoners are faced with a CATCH 22-style problem: in
order to obtain access to legal materials, inmates must submit written
requests for specific materials; however, they cannot effectively do so
because they lack access to the very legal materials that would advise
them which materials to request. 273
VII. "LosT COERCIVE EFFECT," CIVIL CONTEMPT AND THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS: A LACK OF
UNANIMITY IN CASES OF
EXTENDED IMPRISONMENT, OR SILENCE
Predictably, given the silence by the Supreme Court in regard to
whether "lost coercive effect" and the due process clause still have roles
269. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
270. In re Jury Investigation (Appeal of Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 424 n.12 (3d Cir. 1979)
271. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 208-10.
273. Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 68 (3d Cir. 1996).
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to play in extended imprisonment for civil contempt in light of its
"indefinitely until he complies" standard in Bagwell,27 4 there is a lack of
unanimity in the Circuit Courts on this issue. Alternatively, they have
not rendered decisions on this issue discussing Bagwell, or, on the appli-
cability of "lost coercive effect" and due process in civil contempt cases
at all.
A. Circuits Rendering Decisions on "Lost Coercive Effect,"
Either Pre- or Post-Bagwell
1. THE SECOND CIRCUIT
* Soobzokov v. CBS, Inc.275 - The continuing punishment of which
defendant complained was daily fines and not imprisonment. Because
the district judge found that imprisonment "would be totally ineffective
in bringing about the desired result," it should not have imposed a
fine.276
* Simkin v. United States.277 - As discussed earlier, the central issue
in this pre-Bagwell case was whether the requisite coercive effect on the
contemnor had been lost.
* Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Armstrong278 - The
contemnor in this post-Bagwell decision had been in prison for two
years for failing to turn over approximately $14,900,000.00 in corporate
assets to a temporary receiver. The court cited Bagwell, but not its
"indefinitely until he complies" language. 2 79 Its decision centered on
whether the coercive effect had been lost, with the court affirming the
district court's finding that it had not. Moreover, the court noted that,
"[t]he district court fully recognizes that Armstrong's confinement 'can-
not last forever.' "280
* Armstrong v. Guccione2 8 1 - Armstrong returned to the Second
Circuit after then having been imprisoned for seven years. The court
again cited to Bagwell and this time not only included but began its
analysis with the Supreme Court's "indefinitely until he complies" stan-
dard.28 2 The Second Circuit acknowledged the Third Circuit decision in
274. See International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828
(1994).
275. 642 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1981).
276. Id. at 31.
277. 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983).
278. 284 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2002).
279. Id. at 406. The court cited Bagwell indirectly, by referencing an order of the District Court
that had done so.
280. Id. at 406-07 (citing SEC v. Princeton Econ. Int'l Ltd., 152 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
281. 470 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2006).
282. Id. at 101.
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Chadwick, and the Supreme Court's decision in Maggio, holding that an
inference arose in most cases that after long confinement the coercive
effect had been lost.2 83 However, as the court stated:
Armstrong's case, however, is not the ordinary case. Fifteen million
dollars is a life-altering amount of money. We think that [this
amount] is a significant factor to the extent that it would lead the
contemnor to conclude that the risk of continued incarceration is
worth the potential benefit of securing both his freedom and the con-
284cealed property.
As did the Third Circuit in Chadwick, the Second Circuit found that
Maggio did not stand for the proposition that "upon the passage of some
specific period of coercive imprisonment that fails to induce compliance,
an inference must be drawn of an inability to comply." 28S The court
concluded by remanding for a new hearing on whether Armstrong had
the ability to comply, which he denied, and, "on the seventh anniversary
of [his] confinement, his case deserves a fresh look by a different pair of
eyes."2 86
In Armstrong, the Second Circuit moved close to, but did not fully
align itself with, the Third Circuit holding in Chadwick. On the one
hand, it found seven years of imprisonment insufficient to show "lost
coercive effect." On the other hand, it did not go as far as the Third
Circuit and hold that "indefinitely until he complies" in Bagwell can
never mean "indefinitely until he complies or it becomes apparent that
he is never going to comply."2 8 7 Its line was hard, but not as rigid as the
Third Circuit's.
2. THE THIRD CIRCUIT
* United States v. Harris28 8 - Following its decision in Chadwick in
2002, the court, in 2009, found itself facing many of the same issues. In
Harris, the civil contemnor had been in prison for five years, and was
making the same arguments as had Chadwick regarding his sentence: it
had lost its coercive effect, his punishment had over time therefore
turned punitive, and due process required him to be afforded a jury trial
and other procedural protections consistent with criminal contempt. 28 9
One difference was that, unlike Chadwick, his contempt was based on
his refusal to stop doing something, to wit: sending out bogus liens and
283. See id. at 110-11.
284. Id. at 111.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 113.
287. See discussion supra at notes 172-75.
288. 582 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2009).
289. See id. at 515.
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judgments against judges and prosecutors involved in his underlying
criminal prosecution and conviction for conspiracy and fraud, in viola-
tion of the District Court order to the contrary. 2 9 0
In the three respects that mattered, the majority opinion was a
replay of the court's decision in Chadwick. It recited verbatim much of
its prior analysis of Bagwell and the Supreme Court's "indefinitely until
he complies" language, including Judge (now Justice) Alito's italicized
emphasis of "until he complies," and stated that "We fully agree with [it]
.... "291 Second, it distinguished its prior decision in In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Appeal of Braun) as involving a contemnor held in con-
tempt and imprisoned under the Recalcitrant Witness Statute, which
Harris was not (and neither was Chadwick).29 2 Finally, it affirmed the
District Court's order finding Harris to still be in contempt of its original
order.293
The case was made easier for the Third Circuit because Harris had
continued to send out the bogus documents, causing "repeated and dis-
crete violations of the underlying order."294 It was all too much for the
court, such that it held, "we simply cannot countenance a situation
where a contemnor's insistence on continuing his contumacious conduct
inures to his benefit, and we surely do not believe that the Constitution
requires such a result."29 5
The concurring opinion highlighted both the flaws and the unfair-
ness in the majority opinion, against which the majority's authors
attempted to provide insulation by stating, "[w]hile we can conceive of
circumstances where indefinite detention pursuant to a court's civil con-
tempt authority may be so attenuated from its original, valid purpose as
to constitute a due process violation, we see no such violation here."29 6
However, the court did not elaborate on or even describe generally what
its "conception" entailed. As apparent insulation, it was hardly
weatherproof.
Although concurring in the result, Judge DuBois rejected much of
the majority's analysis. He termed its reliance on Bagwell's "indefinitely
until he complies" language to be "misplaced," because:
When read in context, the language in Bagwell does not mean that
civil contempt can continue indefinitely without raising due process
concerns. In fact, Bagwell neither endorses nor precludes the exis-
290. See id. at 513-14.
291. Id. at 518.
292. Id. at 517 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (2006)).
293. Id. at 520.
294. Id. at 519.
295. Id. at 520.
296. Id.
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tence of due process limitations on the continuation of civil contempt
confinement because that issue was not before the Court. Bagwell
dealt with the characterization of a contempt sanction as civil or
criminal at its imposition; the issue was not the termination of an
otherwise lawful coercive sanction. Moreover, Bagwell addressed the
imposition of fines, not incarceration, and discussed coercive incar-
ceration for comparative purposes only. The Bagwell Court had no
occasion to consider whether there existed any limitations-due pro-
cess or otherwise-on the continuation of indefinite civil contempt
confinement.2 9 7
Neither in Chadwick nor Harris had the Third Circuit analyzed
Bagwell in these terms. To the contrary, it seized in both cases on essen-
tially three words-"until he complies"-to the exclusion of any mean-
ingful consideration of what due process rights were owed Harris (and
Chadwick). These three words are found in a holding whose facts did
not concern (1) imprisonment, (2) extended or ongoing punishment, be it
fines or imprisonment, or (3) the lost coercive effect of either (1) or (2)
as bearing on due process. The Third Circuit was unduly narrow in its
view in both cases, and unfairly reliant on Bagwell given the inapplica-
bility of its facts to those before the court.
The second way in which the majority was incorrect, Judge DuBois
wrote, was its attempt to distinguish Braun.29 8 Despite the majority's
belief that Braun's due process analysis was dicta because it arose under
the Recalcitrant Witness Statute, all three of its parts were necessary to
its holding.299 Additionally, "[t]he due process standard articulated and
applied in Braun has not been overruled by the Third Circuit sitting en
banc, and there is no basis for arguing that the Supreme Court abrogated
the standard in Bagwell.""o
In the clearest language making the point that the author could find
in the case law, Judge DuBois stated the following:
In civil contempt cases not covered by the Recalcitrant Witness Stat-
ute, such as this one, due process is the only existing limitation on the
continuation of "unconscionable, indeterminate periods of confine-
ment," and there is no reason to deny due process protection to a civil
contemnor merely because he "carries the keys of his prison in his
own pocket."
... I firmly agree with the majority that an individual should not be
allowed to "thumb its nose" at the district court's authority. However,
civil contempt confinement may not be continued indefinitely on that
297. Id. at 522 (DuBois, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
298. See id. at 522 (DuBois, J., concurring).
299. See id. at 517-18 ("[A]ny language in Braun indicating our approval of the "no
substantial likelihood" test . . . [is] dicta.").
300. Id. at 523 (DuBois, J., concurring).
6392012]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ground alone.301
This concurrence would have served far better as the majority opin-
ion in Chadwick and, although the facts of the case would not have
caused the result to change, in Harris as well. At the least, it was truer to
the facts of Bagwell, and far more advancing of due process protections
for those imprisoned for civil contempt.
3. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Lippitt30 2 - Here, the contemnor was held in con-
tempt for failing to sign over life insurance payments to the government
to pay a fine that was imposed along with 188 months of imprisonment
for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.aos As a result, the
court added forty-seven months to his sentence. Lippitt appealed, claim-
ing that this violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.3 04 The court first
determined that his contempt was civil, thus barring his double jeopardy
claim.30 s
It cited Bagwell, including its "indefinitely until he complies" lan-
guage, but held that "does not end the inquiry, for what starts as coercive
can over time can become punitive."306 Then, notwithstanding this lan-
guage, it proceeded to frame the issue by referring to Lambert v. State of
Montana, a Ninth Circuit, pre-Bagwell case. 07 Ultimately, the court
affirmed the District Court ruling that Lippitt's civil contempt sentence
had not lost its coercive force, and that his imprisonment thereunder
would remain in effect.308
Although the court acknowledged the language in Bagwell, it con-
tinued to determine whether his sentence had lost its coercive effect and
turned punitive, thus placing in it in direct conflict with the Third Circuit
on this issue.309
4. THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Lambert v. Montana3 10 - In answering the "novel question" of
whether due process considerations may affect the duration of imprison-
301. Id. (internal citations omitted).
302. 180 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1999).
303. Id. at 874-75.
304. Id. at 876.
305. Id. at 876-77.
306. Id. at 877.
307. Id. at 877-78 (citing Lambert v. Montana, 545 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1976)).
308. See Lippitt, 180 F.3d at 879.
309. See Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2002); see also United States. v. Harris,
582 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2009).
310. 545 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1976).
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ment for civil contempt and, as discussed above, doing so emphatically
in the affirmative, the Ninth Circuit stands with the Seventh Circuit in
direct conflict with the Third Circuit."
5. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Lawrence v. Goldberg3 12 - In bankruptcy court, Lawrence was
held in civil contempt for refusing to turn over trust assets.? By the
time the Eleventh Circuit decided his appeal, he had been imprisoned for
more than two years. Lawrence challenged the lower court order chiefly
on the basis that it was impossible for him to comply. 314 The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed and affirmed. However, in language which aligned it
with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits as discussed above, it "remind[ed]
the district and bankruptcy courts" of its previous holding: "'When civil
contempt sanctions lose their coercive effect, they become punitive and
violate the contemnor's due process rights.' . . . We are mindful that
'although incarceration for civil contempt may continue indefinitely, it
cannot last forever.'"315 The court made no mention of Bagwell, decided
eight years earlier.
B. The Non-Ruling Courts
The First,316 Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and District of
Columbia Circuit Courts have not yet ruled either on the effect of
Bagwell's language on lost coercive effect and due process protections
in cases involving imprisonment for civil contempt, or, before Bagwell
on such issues.
311. Id. at 88.
312. 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002).
313. Id. at 1297.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1300 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Wellington Precious Metals,
Inc., 950 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1992) and United States v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736, 740 (7th
Cir. 1985)).
316. The First Circuit decided In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 94-1137, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4132 (1st Cir. Mar. 8, 1994), three months before Bagwell. There, the contemnor had been
sentenced to seventy-eight months in prison for illegal gambling, which was stayed during the
duration of his civil contempt for refusing to testify before a grand jury. While the court
mentioned "lost coercive effect," the thrust of its analysis was directed to the civil contemnor's
claim that the district court had failed to make an "individualized determination that there was still
a realistic possibility that continued incarceration would likely result in compliance." Id. at *4.
Moreover, his only request was for remand, not for release. Thus, the focus of the court was on
what the district court had reviewed particularly as to him. It held that there was no evidence "that
the court here considered any factors other than the continued impact of incarceration on
appellant." Id. at *5. The court did not mention due process. For these reasons, the author is not
including the First Circuit as among those that have ruled on a Chadwick-type scenario, and with
similar arguments.
2012] 641
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
VIII. THE NEXT H. BEATTY CHADWICK: WILL THIS CONTEMNOR
RECEIVE DUE PROCESS, OR, BE REFUSED?
As of today, there will be another H. Beatty Chadwick in the form
of a contemnor who faces extended imprisonment for civil contempt,
without a jury trial, by the hand of one or possibly several judges, but
without a guarantee or even the application of due process. There likely
will be several, and possibly even many. It is unlikely that, as in Chad-
wick, they will be attorneys and therefore able to represent themselves
without having to incur substantial legal fees and costs to pursue their
freedom.
Two Circuit Courts have taken positions that will allow what hap-
pened to Chadwick. Eight more are silent on the subject. As for the fifty
states, a review of their civil contempt schemes shows at most four who,
by definition, would not disallow it. In Wisconsin, one who disobeys a
court order may be imprisoned for "only so long as the person is com-
mitting the contempt of court or 6 months, whichever is the shorter
period."317 In Texas, "notwithstanding any other law, a person may not
be confined for [civil contempt] longer than ... the lesser of 18 months
or the period from the date of confinement to the date the person com-
plies with the court order that was the basis of the finding of contempt
9,318
In providing more flexible but still meaningful due process protec-
tion for civil contemnors, Washington has explicitly stated that impris-
onment for civil contempt of an order "may extend only so long as it
serves a coercive purpose."3 19 And, in identical language, so has
Wyoming.320
As to the remaining forty-six states, and what limitations they pre-
scribe for imprisonment for civil contempt, the following language vari-
ations 321 capture by far most of what their statutes or rules of procedure
317. See Wis. STAT. § 785.04(l)(b) (2011); see also Frisch v. Henrichs, 736 N.W.2d 85,
99-100 (Wis. 2007) (citing Larsen v. Larsen, 478 N.W.2d 18 (Wis. 1992), and noting that this
provision eliminated the requirement that civil contempt situations be purgeable)).
318. TEX. Gov'T CODE Arm. § 21.002(h)(2) (West 2011).
319. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030(2)(a) (2011).
320. Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 42.1(b)(1) (This language is located in this rule of criminal procedure,
which states in pertinent part, "Coercive Remedies. If, after notice and hearing, the court finds that
a person has failed or refused to perform an act that is yet within the person's power to perform,
the court may find the person in civil contempt of court and impose one or more of the following
remedial sanctions: (1) Imprisonment which may extend only so long as it serves a coercive
purpose.").
321. While these examples are not intended to be exhaustive of all forty-six states, they do
represent most of what these states' statutes or rules provide on this issue, subject only to minor
differences with those omitted.
642 [Vol. 66:599
MODERN ODYSSEUS OR CLASSIC FRAUD
provide: "until that person purges himself or herself,"322 until perform-
ance of "the act so ordered," 323 "until he has performed it,"3 2 4 "until the
rule, order, or judgment shall be complied with,"32 5 and, "as long as the
civil contempt continues without further hearing. "326
On the other hand, in Florida there is no statement of even a general
limitation: "Every court may punish contempts against it whether such
contempts be direct, indirect, or constructive, and in any such proceed-
ing the court shall proceed to hear and determine all questions of law
and fact."327
The Due Process Clause, whether in the Fifth Amendment 328 appli-
cable to the federal government, or the Fourteenth Amendment 329 appli-
cable to the states, should have a certain and prominent part to play for
those imprisoned for civil contempt. As has been shown in this article,
however, with eight Circuit Courts and forty-six states providing no firm
protection to date, it has enjoyed far too small a role.
A contemnor's need for its protection is great. A brief recap is war-
ranted as a reminder that even the author of the opinion in Bagwell,
Justice Blackmun, warned of the dangers of contempt-that the power
brought to bear against such a person is "uniquely . . . liable to
abuse."3 30 The "offended judge [is] solely responsible for identifying,
prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanctioning the contumacious con-
duct,"33' and, that contempt "strikes at the most vulnerable and human
qualities of a judge's temperament"3 32 and "summons forth . . . the pros-
pect of 'the most tyrannical licentiousness.' "3 And, as was stated con-
cisely but eloquently in the concurring opinion in Harris, "In civil
contempt cases not covered by the Recalcitrant Witness Statute, such as
this one, due process is the only existing limitation on the continuation
322. ALA. R. Civ. P. 70A(e)(2).
323. COLO. R. Civ. PRO. 107(d)(2).
324. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-611 (2011).
325. Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-1-17 (West 2011).
326. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21(b) (2011).
327. FLA. STAT. § 38.22 (2011). And, nothing in FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380, "Sanctions", does more
than mention "contempt" as an available remedy.
328. U.S. CONST. amend V ("nor shall any person be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law").
329. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
330. International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831
(1994) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968)).
331. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831.
332. Id. (quoting Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202).
333. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831 (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481
U.S. 787, 822 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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of unconscionable, indeterminate periods of confinement ....
The following, the author respectfully suggests, would serve to pro-
vide the necessary additional protection:
1. The Supreme Court should, at its earliest opportunity, harmo-
nize its prior holdings that coercive effect or purpose is the hallmark of
civil contempt3 35 with its "indefinitely until he complies" language in
Bagwell.336 It should clarify that such language was not intended to
apply literally to a case of continuing imprisonment or fines, because it
would be "abhorrent"337 to hold that one could be imprisoned for life or
fined regularly without end without benefit of trial by jury and other
criminal protections. It should hold that lost coercive effect of the con-
tinuing punishment, if found by the reviewing court, is an appropriate
due process basis upon which such punishment for civil contempt3 38
should be ended; and, that "there is no reason to deny due process pro-
tection to a civil contemnor merely because he 'carries the keys of his
prison in his own pocket.' "3 39 The alternative would be to hold that even
though a civil contemnor had the ability to comply, a life sentence could
be appropriate, and notwithstanding all of the dangers inherent in the
exercise of the contempt power.340
2. While the Court should avoid any temporal limitations on con-
tempt because "it would lead the contemnor to conclude that the risk of
continued incarceration is worth the potential benefit of securing both
his freedom and the concealed property,"34 it should create a presump-
tion as to when coercive effect of that punishment has been lost. The
author suggests that an appropriate point in time for its application
would be two years after imposition of punishment for violation of the
underlying order. Such a presumption would be rebuttable, with the bur-
den being on the party opposing termination of the punishment to show
by the preponderance of the evidence that the coercive effect had not
been lost. As this would still be part of a civil contempt proceeding, and
as is currently true, neither a jury trial34 2 nor state-appointed counsel 34 3
334. United States v. Harris, 582 F.3d 512, 523 (3d Cir. 2009) (DuBois, J., concurring)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
335. See cases cited supra note 237.
336. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828.
337. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 424 (3d Cir. 1979).
338. The fact that a contemnor is released from confinement for civil contempt does not bar his
then being charged with criminal contempt "even if [the civil and criminal proceedings] arise out
of the same factual setting." United States v. Marquardo, 149 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 1998).
339. Harris, 582 F.3d at 523 (DuBois, J., concurring).
340. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831.
341. Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89, 111 (2d Cir. 2006).
342. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 365 (1966); discussion supra notes 53-55.
343. See Cooke v. United States 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925). But see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.
Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (where the Supreme Court held, in analyzing whether the provision of
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would be provided.
Such a presumption would fairly satisfy the important interest of
courts in seeing that their orders are not flouted without serious conse-
quences. Two years in prison, away from one's family and friends com-
bined with the numerous other detriments to be incurred, is a serious
consequence. As a presumption, and not a temporal limitation, it would
not automatically stand in the way of continued punishment beyond the
two-year period.
Finally, it would give the opposing civil party ample time to dis-
cover either the location of what the contemnor is refusing to provide or
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption.
3. If the Supreme Court is not willing to provide the above protec-
tions, then state courts, state legislatures, and Circuit Courts should
implement them. The exception, of course, would be harmonizing the
Supreme Court's language in Bagwell with its prior holdings on coer-
cive effect. State legislatures, in particular, should take a significant step
forward by following the lead of Washington and Wyoming3" and
requiring a continuing coercive effect in order to continue punishment
for civil contempt.
4. There is wisdom in the approach of the Second Circuit, as in
Armstrong, in requiring a "fresh look by a different pair of eyes" 3 45
where a civil contemnor has endured continued punishment. The court
did not specify its reasons, perhaps because they are obvious. If justifi-
cation is needed, it is quickly found in the potential for judicial abuse in
contempt cases described by Justice Blackmun, and the benefits of
guarding against them.346
In Armstrong, the "fresh look" was ordered after seven years'
imprisonment. This seems too long. A fairer limit would be four years of
continued punishment, be it imprisonment or fines, at which point the
contemnor's case should be assigned to a different judge. Four years is
twice the amount of time recommended above for the presumption of
lost coercive effect to arise. And, this time period would not cause a
"revolving door" of judicial assignments for any single contemnor.
5. Where the Supreme Court has been silent as to the validity of a
basis argued for statutory habeas relief,3 47 the ability to obtain such
counsel to a contemnor imprisoned for failure to pay child support was required by the Due
Process clause, that such could be required in civil contempt proceedings depending on the nature
of the case).
344. See discussion supra at notes 319-20.
345. See Armstrong, 470 F.3d at 113.
346. See International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831
(1994).
347. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006); see discussion supra accompanying notes 230-34.
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relief, as the author has argued occurred in Chadwick's case, is unfairly
lost. The statute, section 2254, provides in pertinent part:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-
cation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.348
To avoid "opening the floodgates" to habeas petitioners, or any-
thing approaching such an event, any expansion of this statute should be
made only after careful consideration, and in the most narrow manner
possible consistent with achieving the purpose of the change. However,
there should be an interest in not having contemnors such as Chadwick
and other habeas petitioners placed in "Catch-22" situations due simply
to silence by the Supreme Court. Especially when there may be Circuit
Court law available to them that would support their habeas petitions.
Therefore, to allow courts to consider the grant of habeas relief when the
Supreme Court has been silent, the author proposes the following:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-
cation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States or, in the absence of any decision
by the Supreme Court material to the matter in question, by the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal in whose geographical jurisdiction the State
court exists.
IX. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether Chadwick was a modem Odysseus or a clas-
sic fraud, the judicial system failed him in all the ways described above.
The substantial likelihood that he was very far from blameless does not
change the fact that he was entitled to the benefits of the due process
clause. No legal authority need be cited for the proposition that even
those who commit the most heinous crimes will be provided such
protection.
That he should have been put in prison for failure to comply with
348. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2006).
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his court order is hardly doubtful. That he should have stayed in prison
for fourteen years is, to use the same and very apt descriptor provided by
the Third Circuit itself, "abhorrent." By comparison, in one way at least,
Odysseus was fortunate. He was able to return to Ithaca after only ten
years.
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